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This study examines the effects of home-state unemployment rates on attrition behavior of Navy enlistees for
successive career windows during the first term of service: the first 6months, the second 6months, the second
year, and the third year of service. The results indicate that attrition is negatively associated with changes in
the local unemployment rate during the first three career windows covering two years of service. However,
after two years of service, the estimated effect of the unemployment rate becomes insignificant for most
groups of sailors. This is likely because sailors with the poorest job matches are sorted out early in the first
term of service.
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INTRODUCTION
Although it has been established empirically that labor market conditions affect
enlistment and reenlistment decisions in the US military (Arkes and Kilburn, 2005;
Asch and Warner, 2007), it remains uncertain how the labor market affects in-service
attrition decisions of enlisted personnel. Although this is an important question for pol-
icy-makers, neither the exact nature nor the magnitude of the relationship between
unemployment and early military attrition has been established by researchers. The lack
of research is due, in part, to problems in specifying empirical models that accurately
capture the dynamic decision-making process of new recruits during their first term of
service. The goal of this study is to review the modeling issues and to develop an
appropriate empirical model to estimate the effect of employment conditions on attrition
behavior.
In military parlance, attrition occurs when service members leave before they complete
the obligated service on their initial enlistment contracts.1 Understanding attrition behavior
is important to policy-makers for several reasons. First, attrition is used as an indicator of
recruit performance, and military applicants are screened based on their predicted
*Corresponding author. Email: arkes@nps.edu
1In military manpower terminology, ‘separation’ refers to enlistees who complete their contractual service obliga-
tions, but choose not to reenlist, whereas ‘attrition’ refers to new recruits who do not complete their contracts.
Navy enlistment contracts vary between four and six years in length, but most contracts are four years in length.
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probability of successfully completing the first term of service.2 Second, attrition involves
direct costs in the form of wasted recruiting and training expenditures, and indirect costs
in the form of reduced manning and force readiness (Government Accountability Office,
2000). The average recruiting cost for Navy recruits is over $19,000, but ranges as high as
$30,000 for high-aptitude recruits (high school diploma graduates with above-average
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores) (US Navy Recruiting Command, 2011).
The Navy accesses roughly 35,000–37,000 new active-duty enlisted recruits yearly. Attri-
tion during the seven weeks of basic recruit training was about 9% for the 2011 (fiscal-
year) entry cohort (Center for Naval Analyses, 2012).3 Three-year attrition rates in our data
for the entry cohorts from 1999 to 2007 ranged from 33 (2000 cohort) to 22% (2003
cohort).
The period between 2007 and 2011 witnessed one of the most severe economic reces-
sions in US history. The annual national unemployment rate more than doubled from 4.6%
in 2007 to 9.6% in 2010.4 During this economic downturn, overall first-term attrition of
Navy enlisted personnel dropped by about 9% points (Center for Naval Analyses, 2012).
One possibility is that this trend in attrition simply reflected the increase in higher quality
applicants that normally occurs during economic downturns, a group with a lower average
attrition rate. However, another possibility is that the trend also suggests that the weak
labor market may have had a direct effect on in-service attrition behavior.
Some prior empirical studies support the view that civilian employment conditions
directly affect in-service attrition behavior. The Center for Naval Analyses (2011) finds that
a 5% increase in the national annual unemployment rate is associated with a 2.3% drop in
12month (cohort) attrition and is one of the factors with the greatest impact on attrition.
However, the Center for Naval Analyses study highlights some of the problems in empiri-
cally evaluating the attrition–unemployment relationship. First, the use of the national
unemployment rate to assess the unemployment–attrition relationship is questionable as it
may pick up the effects of other factors that also are changing over time. Furthermore,
measures of economic conditions at the national level may not accurately reflect conditions
in the local labor markets that are likely to be relevant to young service members’ behav-
ior. In addition, measures of the monthly variation in economic conditions may be needed
to capture sailors’ decision-making processes during the first months of military service
when they are learning about the military lifestyle and evaluating the job match.
In this study, we examine how state-level unemployment rates affect attrition at various
points during the first term of service of new recruits. We control for state and year effects
so that the models are capturing how within-state changes over time in the unemployment
rate affect within-state variation in the probability of attrition at various career stages dur-
ing the first term.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON ATTRITION BEHAVIOR
The standard approach in analyses of individual job mobility is to view such decisions as
investments in human capital that are based on economic benefits and costs (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 2009). The primary component of the monetary benefit of job separation
2For example, educational attainment is highly correlated with survival of new recruits, which is why DOD
screens military applicants based on their educational credentials. Applicants with traditional high school diplomas
have the lowest attrition risk and are considered the most desirable recruits (Laurence et al., 1996).
3One estimate (Government Accountability Office, 1997) indicated that the Navy lost $126million in recruiting
and training investments in recruits who separated during the first six months of service.
4Data retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cps.
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consists of the expected pay and benefits associated with a new job if an individual
switched jobs. Monetary benefits of quitting are greater when the labor market is growing
and alternative civilian jobs are plentiful. Indeed, in the civilian labor force, where binding
employment contracts are seldom used, voluntary quits have been found to vary systemati-
cally with labor market conditions.
Job match quality is also an important factor in job turnover. Job matching theory bases
separation decisions on utility-maximizing occupational choice behavior. A match between
a worker and firm occurs when the total value of the job match exceeds the opportunity
values for the worker and the firm.5 In job matching theory, employers and workers form
expectations based on incomplete information. In the case of the military, new recruits are
not fully informed about the military lifestyle or job requirements and the employer is not
fully informed about new recruits’ job productivity. A discharge occurs when either party’s
expectations are not fulfilled. In a growing economy, employees switch jobs in an attempt
to improve job match quality and it is plausible that labor market conditions would have
similar effects on early military job turnover.
However, there are some costs of quitting that are uniquely associated with military
attrition so that it would be uncertain as to whether the strength of the labor market would
matter for attrition decisions. These costs arise from the potentially enforceable military
contract. For example, those who leave early may receive a less-than-honorable or dishon-
orable discharge, which may affect their future employability. In addition, those who fail
to complete their contracts may not qualify for veterans’ programs, such as GI Bill educa-
tional benefits. Finally, the potentially enforceable contract itself tends to dampen military
turnover in part because it induces self-selection among those who apply for military
jobs.6
Despite the fact that recruits serve under a contractual obligation, as mentioned earlier,
the three-year Navy attrition rate (which covers most of the first term of service) in our
data ranges from 22 to 33% for the 1999–2007 entry cohorts. An earlier study by the
Government Accountability Office (1998b) found first-term attrition rates in the military
average about 30% per year. In our data, attrition includes both voluntary ‘quits’ on the
part of the service member as well as those sailors who are ‘fired’ by the military. For
example, military commanders may discharge recruits for poor performance or behavioral
problems, or recruits may provoke discharges by deliberately performing poorly or display-
ing behavioral problems. Buddin (1984) points out the conceptual difficulties for research-
ers in distinguishing military ‘quits’ from ‘fires.’7 Klein et al. (1991) show that official
military separation codes seldom identify the true reason for a discharge and the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (1998a) concludes that separation codes are applied inconsis-
tently and subjectively. This may simply reflect that most attrition is due to a poor job
match, as determined by failure to meet minimum performance standards, and that military
commanders are reluctant to force contract compliance by recruits who are poorly matched
with the military.
Given that recruits can terminate the contract with poor job performance, it is plausible
that when alternative civilian job vacancies are plentiful an individual may be willing to
take steps to provoke an early ‘fire.’ That is, individuals may put less effort into their jobs
5Buddin (1994) and Antel et al. (1987) have applied job matching theory to military attrition.
6Turnover rates in the military and in civilian jobs among youth differ dramatically. The military attrition rate
averages about 30% per year. By contrast, in the civilian workforce, for jobs held by young workers 18–24 years
old, about 56% end within one year and about 70% end within two years (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
7Note that in the civilian workforce there are similar conceptual difficulties in distinguishing between quits (volun-
tary job mobility) and layoffs (McLaughlin, 1991).
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or into conducting themselves appropriately, thus increasing the likelihood of being ‘fired.’
Moreover, it is likely that the relationship between the economy and attrition has strength-
ened in recent years with the growth of internet job sites, social media, and other elec-
tronic sources of information that have increased the flow of information on alternative
civilian job vacancies (Stevenson, 2009).
An issue in empirically examining the attrition–unemployment relationship is identifying
the specific geographic labor market where recruits search when evaluating their alternative
job opportunities and making attrition decisions. One empirical approach is to assume that
the relevant geographic labor market is that of the individual’s home state. This approach
is based on the youth of new military recruits, most of whom are recent high school grad-
uates whose social connections are with family and friends in their home areas.8
An alternative approach would be to assume that recruits conduct job search in the local
labor market where they are currently assigned. However, there are several reasons to
believe military personnel would not conduct job search in the area of their current job
assignment. First, young recruits would lack information about the area around their duty
station and would have few personal contacts in the area. Also, nearly all new enlistees
are single (96% in our data-set), live on-base rather than in the local community, and
would not have developed a social network in the local area. If sailors did consider local
conditions at their current duty station, they would likely do so only later in their careers
when they are more mature and more likely to be married. Married service members qual-
ify for housing allowances and can choose to live in the local community rather than in
on-base military housing.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior research on military attrition is extensive and a number of empirical regularities have
emerged regarding the attrition effects of recruit characteristics, such as educational attain-
ment (see, e.g. Buddin, 1984, 2005; Wenger and Hodari, 2004). However, the extant
empirical analysis of the impact of unemployment on attrition is limited and provides
mixed information about either the existence or magnitude of this relationship.
The study most similar to our own (Golding et al., 2001) examines attrition of Navy
enlistees in the first, second, and third years of service. The authors consider both the
unemployment rate in the sailor’s home state and the ratio of military pay to civilian pay,
which does not vary across geographic areas. However, the study does not specify at what
career point the economic variables are measured, so it is difficult to distinguish between
the effects of economic conditions at entry vs. at the time of the in-service attrition deci-
sion. Perhaps because of this, the authors find mixed evidence on the relationship between
the unemployment rate and attrition.
Cox (2003) analyzes attrition among a subset of first-term enlistees with five- and six-
year initial contracts, and includes the state unemployment rate at the time of accession as
a covariate. The study estimates separate models for each year between 1993 and 1997. In
these cross-sectional analyses, they find that the unemployment rate is largely statistically
insignificant. One reason for the lack of significant results may be because the unemploy-
ment rate is measured at the time of accession rather than during the first term of service,
when actual attrition decisions are made. This specification could reflect the opposing
effects of unemployment at the enlistment point, as discussed above.
8The majority of new recruits are recruited during their senior year in high school. After graduation they normally
spend a few months at home in the Delayed Entry Pool before they are sent to boot camp.
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An additional issue with both Golding et al. (2001) and Cox (2003) is that the estimates
are subject to unobserved heterogeneity, or in this case, the incidental correlation of a
state’s unemployment rate and the propensity for sailors from that state to attrite. This
occurs in Cox because he uses a series of cross-sectional analyses and in Golding et al.
because they use multiple years but do not include state fixed effects, meaning that it is
effectively a cross-sectional analysis as well.
Buddin (2005) analyzes attrition of Army recruits during basic training and during the
first term of service. He includes both the home-county unemployment rate at the time of
the contract and at the time of accession, the difference between these two dates reflecting
the time an individual spends in the delayed entry program. Buddin finds increases in the
unemployment rate at the time of the contract is associated with lower boot-camp attrition.
However, he finds that the unemployment rate at the time of accession is statistically insig-
nificant. This suggests that the strength of the labor market mainly affected the type of per-
son who enlisted, while the current unemployment rate (at boot camp, which is very close
in time to the accession date) has no effect on attrition. At the same time, in Buddin’s
study, these unemployment rates (at the time of the contract and accession) are not signifi-
cantly associated with overall first-term attrition probabilities.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Our data-set is drawn from Navy Enlisted Master files and contains demographic informa-
tion and service history on active duty personnel who entered the Navy between 1999 and
2009. The data-set provides accession and separation dates for enlistees as well as basic
demographic information. Data on monthly state-level unemployment rates are obtained
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. These unemployment rates are for all adults (age
16 and over) in a state. Unemployment rates for more narrowly defined demographic
groups are not available on a monthly basis at the state level.
Dependent Variables
We analyze attrition outcomes for four different career windows during the first term of
service for those who enlist with four-year contracts. The first career window captures
attrition during the first six months of service when new recruits receive basic military
training and advanced skill training. Attrition during this career window may be influenced
largely by job match quality as new recruits learn about the military lifestyle and job train-
ing requirements and the organization learns more about recruits’ true job productivities.
We also analyze career windows beyond the first six months of service. Attrition during
these post-training periods tends to impose greater costs on the military due to the exten-
sive training investments that have been completed at that point. For career windows
beyond the first 6months, we analyze three conditional attrition outcomes: 1. attrition by
12months of service, conditional on surviving the first six months; 2. attrition by
24months, conditional on surviving for the first 12months; and 3. attrition by 36months,
conditional on surviving for the first 24months.
Economic Variables
We adopt two different strategies to measure the primary economic variable. First, for each
of the four career periods we use the average state-level unemployment rate during the
entire period based on the recruit’s home of record. Thus, for the analysis of six-month
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attrition, we use the average monthly home-state unemployment rate during the first six
months of service; for the second career window we use the average monthly home-
state unemployment rate during months 7–12; for the third career window we use the
average unemployment rate for months 13–24; and, and for the fourth stage we use
the average rate for months 25–36. While this strategy represents a plausible approach
to capture the effect of unemployment rates on individual behavior, it is not without
drawbacks. For example, if the sailor leaves early in a given career window, the unem-
ployment rate for the later months in the period would be irrelevant to the attrition
decision, even though the unemployment indicator includes these months.
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the selected unemployment measure, we
also used the average unemployment rate for just the first three months of each career
window. This approach assumes that the first three months of each career window are
the most relevant to attrition decisions during that specific career window. However,
this approach has the drawback that it may miss the effect of unemployment in the
later months of a given career window. It turns out that the results using this alterna-
tive approach are similar to the first approach, so we report only the results from the
first approach.9
The attrition models control for the year of entry for the sailor and the sailor’s home
state. Thus, the estimated effect of the unemployment rate is identified based on how
within-(home)-state changes over time in the unemployment rate and attrition are
related.
Other Control Variables
The attrition model specifications include a set of demographic variables, including
education credential, age, gender, race indicators, and whether the sailor has any
dependents – a spouse or children – at the accession point. The educational creden-
tial variables include indicators for less than a high school diploma, General Educa-
tional Development (GED),10 an alternative credential, some college, and a final
category for any postsecondary degree (Associate’s, Bachelor’s, or a Professional
degree). The schooling credential variables most likely serve as proxies for persever-
ance or other unobserved noncognitive attributes. Prior studies consistently find that
high school dropouts have higher attrition rates than those with traditional high
school diplomas.11
AFQT scores measure general aptitude so that those with higher scores should be better
planners who are able to make more informed career choices. On the other hand, since
AFQT scores are used for specific occupational assignments, its effect on attrition will be
attenuated. About 6% of the observations have a missing AFQT score. So as not to lose
these observations, we assign the mean AFQT score to these individuals and include an
indicator variable for having a missing AFQT score in the model. The specifications also
include indicator variables for whether the sailor entered the service with an advanced pay
grade (greater than E! 1). Advanced pay grades are granted for a number of reasons, such
9Full results from the second approach are available from the authors.
10The GED, or General Educational Development program, involves a set of tests that certify high school-level
academic skills. It is taken mostly by high school dropouts to obtain the certificate of high school equivalency
(Heckman et al., 2010).
11For example, Wenger and Hodari (2004) find that Navy recruits who do not possess a high school diploma have
an early attrition rate 42% higher than those with a traditional high school diploma.
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as for completing a high school Junior Reserve Officers Training Course (JROTC)
program, which may affect the quality of the job match.12 Finally, military policies on
how to treat poor performers can change over time, but these policies are not observable
in our data-set. To capture changes in discharge policies we also include fiscal-year
dummy variables.
Sample
The analysis sample consists of first-term, active duty sailors who enlisted with a four-year
service obligation between 1999 and 2009. Individuals who separate from the Navy for
‘legitimate’ reasons during the first term of service are omitted from the analysis samples
for each career window.13 We also drop sailors who did not or would not have reached the
12Reasons for receiving an advanced pay grade include, among others, completion of youth development pro-
grams such as high school JROTC, or Sea Scouts, completion of college credits or vocational school, prior mili-
tary service, and referral of new recruit, to the Navy (US Navy PRIDE data base).
13‘Legitimate’ reasons include, among others, disability, transfer to an officer commissioning program, or transfer
to the Naval Reserve.
TABLE I Descriptive Statistics (n= 406,140 Unless Otherwise Noted)
Mean Std. Dev.
Attrited in first 6months 0.104 0.305
Attrited in second 6months (n = 363,000) 0.044 0.206
Attrited in second year (n = 324,746) 0.074 0.262
Attrited in third year (n= 267,566) 0.063 0.242
Average state unemployment rate for months 1–6 of service 5.385 1.697
Average state unemployment rate for months 7–12 of service (n= 363,000) 5.681 1.964
Average state unemployment rate for months 13–24 of service (n = 324,746) 5.852 1.953
Average state unemployment rate for months 25–36 of service (n = 267,566) 5.993 1.894
Black 0.201 0.401
Asian 0.040 0.196
Native American 0.061 0.239
Other race 0.075 0.263
Less than high school 0.024 0.153
Alternative credential 0.025 0.157
GED 0.039 0.194
More than a H.S. diploma 0.026 0.160
BA, AA, or Professional degree 0.028 0.165
Age (at entry) 20.47 2.81
Female 0.181 0.385
AFQT percentile score 61.10 17.87
Missing AFQT score 0.069 0.253
Advanced pay grade (at entry) 0.350 0.477
No dependents (at entry) 0.959 0.197
Entered in FY 1999 0.101 0.301
Entered in FY 2000 0.119 0.323
Entered in FY 2001 0.108 0.311
Entered in FY 2002 0.101 0.301
Entered in FY 2003 0.088 0.283
Entered in FY 2004 0.072 0.258
Entered in FY 2005 0.083 0.275
Entered in FY 2006 0.076 0.266
Entered in FY 2007 0.082 0.275
Entered in FY 2008 0.087 0.282
Entered in FY 2009 0.084 0.277
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end of a given attrition window by the end point of our data, February 2011. For example,
if sailors completed only 19months of service by February 2011, they would be included
in the 6-month and 12-month attrition models, but not in any models for subsequent attri-
tion windows, even if they had separated. The reason we do not include them (even if they
had separated) is that, among those who were recent enlistees, we would have included
them in the sample only if they had separated – thus, we would have a biased sample.
After applying the restrictions, the samples for the 6-month, second-6-months, second-year,
and third-year attrition models contain 406,140, 363,000, 324,746, and 267,566 observa-
tions, respectively. Our data-set represents a large sample drawn from 11 cohorts of new
Navy enlistees. Also, the data-set covers time periods that represent wide variations in
unemployment rates, ranging from the tight labor markets of the ‘dot com’ boom period to
the severe recession that began in 2007.
Table I displays descriptive statistics for the analysis variables used in the attrition
models. Table I shows that loss rates are 10.4% for 6-month attrition, 4.4% for 12-month










Male 0.097 0.044 0.076 0.063
Female 0.136 0.045 0.066 0.060
Race
White 0.109 0.048 0.074 0.061
Black 0.101 0.039 0.084 0.075
Asian 0.070 0.024 0.038 0.036
Native American 0.108 0.048 0.080 0.066
Other race 0.089 0.037 0.062 0.055
Characteristics (at entry)
No advanced pay grade 0.119 0.051 0.084 0.069
Advanced pay grade 0.077 0.032 0.056 0.051
No dependents 0.105 0.044 0.074 0.063
Had dependents 0.094 0.042 0.075 0.067
Highest education
Less than high school 0.172 0.086 0.138 0.112
Alternative credential 0.137 0.069 0.124 0.096
GED 0.165 0.086 0.135 0.111
High school diploma 0.099 0.041 0.068 0.058
More than a HS
diploma
0.137 0.063 0.126 0.105
BA, AA, or professional
degree
0.071 0.026 0.038 0.034
Fiscal year of entry
Entered in FY 1999 0.158 0.062 0.091 0.066
Entered in FY 2000 0.138 0.057 0.089 0.065
Entered in FY 2001 0.122 0.053 0.083 0.054
Entered in FY 2002 0.085 0.042 0.064 0.070
Entered in FY 2003 0.059 0.034 0.077 0.070
Entered in FY 2004 0.077 0.039 0.076 0.075
Entered in FY 2005 0.088 0.041 0.075 0.063
Entered in FY 2006 0.093 0.040 0.071 0.052
Entered in FY 2007 0.107 0.040 0.058 0.051
Entered in FY 2008 0.105 0.038 0.057
Entered in FY 2009 0.082 0.034
aConditional attrition rates.
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attrition (conditional on staying 6months), 7.4% for 24-month attrition (conditional on
staying 12months), and 6.3% for 36-month attrition (conditional on staying 24months).
Thus, the overall 36-month attrition rate for all 11 entry cohorts is about 29%. The
descriptive statistics for the demographic and military variables are based on the 406,140
sailors in the sample for the first 6months. Women constitute about 18% of the sample,
blacks about 20%, and Asians and Native Americans about 10%. About 35% of new
recruits enter with an advanced pay grade. About 9% of the sample consists of high school
dropouts, but about two-thirds of those have an alternative credential or a GED. The mean
AFQT percentile score for new recruits is 61.1.
Table II presents the attrition rates for each of the four career windows for various
groups defined by demographic and military characteristics. Attrition rates are lower for
males than females for the first 6months of service, but higher for males during the second
year of service. Attrition rates are similar for whites, blacks, and Native Americans, but
they are much lower for Asians and those in the ‘Other race’ category. For education,
those with a traditional high school diploma or a postsecondary degree have the lowest
attrition, even lower than those with more than a high school diploma but no degree.
Empirical Model
The empirical attrition model is specified as a probit model:






atTt þ eist ð1Þ
where Y is the attrition indicator for sailor i from state s with entry year t, X is the set
of demographic and military factors described above, EC represents the economic condi-
tions during each career window, and S and T are indicator variables for state and year.
The state effects could capture differences in the general commitment to the military
among recruits from certain states. The year fixed effects could capture, among other fac-
tors, changes in attrition rates over time that may result from the the Navy being able to
be more selective in its recruits as the recession intensified and endstrength was reduced
through the 2000s. By controlling for state and year, similar to what a fixed-effects model
would do, our estimates represent the effect of within-state changes in the unemployment
rate (relative to other states) on within-state changes in attrition rates (relative to other
states). In addition, the estimates are not subject to incidental correlated differences across
states in attrition rates (measuring job match quality) and unemployment rates. As men-
tioned above, Equation (1) is estimated as a probit model. We cluster at the state level to
allow for correlated observations for individuals from the same state (Moulton, 1990).
RESULTS
Table III presents the estimated partial effects of each variable from the probit attrition
models for the four career windows. The partial effects indicate that, during the first three
career windows, higher home-state unemployment rates are associated with significantly
lower attrition probabilities. The magnitude of the estimated effect of unemployment varies
somewhat depending on the career window. During the first 6months of service, a one-
percentage-point increase in the state unemployment rate is associated with a 0.5-percent-
age-point decrease in the attrition probability (p< 0.001). At the mean 6-month attrition
rate (.104) this represents a 5% decrease in attrition (0.005/.104), which is a relatively
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modest effect. In the 12-month attrition model, a one-percentage-point increase in the
unemployment rate leads to a 0.002-percentage-point decrease in the 12-month attrition
rate (p< 0.001), which represents a 4% decrease at the mean 12-month attrition rate
(0.002/.044). In the 24-month conditional attrition model, an increase in the unemployment
rate is associated with a 0.3-percentage-point (or roughly 4%) decrease in the 24-month
attrition rate (p< 0.001). In the 36-month conditional attrition model, the unemployment
effect is not statistically significant.










Avg. state unemployment rate
in first 6 months of service
!0.005 (5.39)⁄⁄⁄
Avg. state unemployment rate
in months 7–12 of service
!0.002 (4.50)⁄⁄⁄
Avg. state unemployment rate
in months 13–24 of service
!0.003 (3.25)⁄⁄⁄
Avg. state unemployment rate
in months 25–36 of service
!0.001 (1.15)
Race (Caucasian is the reference category)
Black !0.017 (6.64)⁄⁄⁄ !0.009 (5.05)⁄⁄⁄ 0.004 (1.16) 0.006 (2.58)⁄⁄⁄
Asian !0.030 (14.88)⁄⁄⁄ !0.018 (11.74)⁄⁄⁄ !0.032 (9.83)⁄⁄⁄ !0.022 (6.73)⁄⁄⁄
Native American 0.003 (1.12) 0.003 (1.49) 0.009 (5.46)⁄⁄⁄ 0.007 (4.60)⁄⁄⁄
Other race !0.014 (4.08)⁄⁄⁄ !0.007 (3.01)⁄⁄⁄ !0.011 (5.02)⁄⁄⁄ !0.008 (3.02)⁄⁄⁄
Education Credential (high school diploma is the reference category)
Less than high school 0.066 (19.31)⁄⁄⁄ 0.038 (17.30)⁄⁄⁄ 0.070 (16.45)⁄⁄⁄ 0.059 (14.85)⁄⁄⁄
Alternative credential 0.035 (8.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.027 (9.04)⁄⁄⁄ 0.053 (18.94)⁄⁄⁄ 0.035 (16.37)⁄⁄⁄
GED 0.056 (24.86)⁄⁄⁄ 0.039 (20.89)⁄⁄⁄ 0.066 (21.63)⁄⁄⁄ 0.056 (19.35)⁄⁄⁄
Some college 0.036 (9.65)⁄⁄⁄ 0.027 (9.51)⁄⁄⁄ 0.063 (17.86)⁄⁄⁄ 0.048 (14.17)⁄⁄⁄
AA, BA, or Professional
degree
!0.014 (3.16)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (0.45) !0.008 (2.74)⁄⁄⁄ !0.009 (2.71)⁄⁄⁄
Other demographic variables
Age 0.004 (11.07)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (3.04)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (5.06)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (3.23)⁄⁄⁄
Female 0.044 (21.21)⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 (5.56)⁄⁄⁄ !0.007 (4.60)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (0.60)
(AFQT percentile score)/100 !0.066 (10.73)⁄⁄⁄ !0.002 (0.69) !0.042 (8.86)⁄⁄⁄ !0.040 (8.69)⁄⁄⁄
Has missing AFQT score 0.006 (4.16)⁄⁄⁄ 0.002 (2.37)⁄⁄ 0.006 (3.39)⁄⁄⁄ 0.004 (2.23)⁄⁄
Advanced pay grade at entry !0.030 (28.68)⁄⁄⁄ !0.015 (19.13)⁄⁄⁄ !0.020 (20.15)⁄⁄⁄ !0.014 (13.60)⁄⁄⁄
No dependents at entry 0.017 (10.76)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (0.44) !0.003 (1.19) !0.002 (0.74)
Fiscal year of enlistment (FY1999 is the excluded category)
Enlisted in FY2000 !0.016 (6.81)⁄⁄⁄ !0.004 (2.64)⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 (0.25) 0.000 (0.10)
Enlisted in FY2001 !0.025 (9.83)⁄⁄⁄ !0.004 (2.71)⁄⁄⁄ !0.003 (1.32) !0.011 (6.33)⁄⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2002 !0.046 (14.88)⁄⁄⁄ !0.011 (6.20)⁄⁄⁄ !0.017 (7.99)⁄⁄⁄ 0.006 (2.77)⁄⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2003 !0.061 (21.83)⁄⁄⁄ !0.015 (11.19)⁄⁄⁄ !0.003 (1.42) 0.009 (4.34)⁄⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2004 !0.044 (18.92)⁄⁄⁄ !0.011 (7.14)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (0.68) 0.017 (6.77)⁄⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2005 !0.041 (13.57)⁄⁄⁄ !0.012 (8.92)⁄⁄⁄ !0.006 (3.45)⁄⁄⁄ 0.002 (1.27)
Enlisted in FY2006 !0.040 (16.19)⁄⁄⁄ !0.013 (7.25)⁄⁄⁄ !0.008 (4.43)⁄⁄⁄ !0.006 (2.21)⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2007 !0.029 (10.61)⁄⁄⁄ !0.013 (7.75)⁄⁄⁄ !0.017 (5.28)⁄⁄⁄ !0.005 (1.54)
Enlisted in FY2008 !0.025 (9.03)⁄⁄⁄ !0.010 (5.24)⁄⁄⁄ !0.010 (2.16)⁄⁄
Enlisted in FY2009 !0.031 (7.50)⁄⁄⁄ !0.009 (3.65)⁄⁄⁄
Number of observations 406,140 363,000 314,802 260,264
Note: aConditional attrition rates.
Estimates represent marginal effects. State fixed effects are not displayed. T-statistics are in parentheses.
⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 levels.
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These results suggest that the home–state labor market influences sailors’ attrition
behavior throughout the first two years of service and that the effect seems relatively small
compared to the overall attrition rates in the given career periods. After two years of ser-
vice, sailors no longer appear to be influenced by home–area labor market conditions. This
is likely due to the fact that the sorting process during the first 24months eliminates
recruits who are poorly matched with the military lifestyle or with their initial job assign-
ments. Another contributing factor is that after two years of service sailors have accumu-
lated extensive firm-specific training, which tends to reduce turnover in general and
sailors’ responsiveness to fluctuations in the civilian labor market.
Among the other determinants, the results find that, consistent with prior studies (e.
g. Cox, 2003), more education is associated with lower attrition rates. High school
dropouts without an alternative credential or a GED are about 6.6-percentage-points
more likely to separate during the first six months than those with a traditional high
school diploma. This large effect is mitigated somewhat for dropouts with an alterna-
tive credential or GED. The results also indicate that minority groups are less likely
to attrite than whites, with the exception of Native Americans. We also find that, as
expected, those who enter the Navy with an advanced pay grade have lower attrition
probabilities. This result supports the argument that those with advanced pay grades
enter the Navy with pre-enlistment backgrounds (such as completion of a high school
JROTC or other youth development program) that are correlated with higher quality
job matches.14
Those who have no dependents at entry have higher attrition rates during the first
six months of service. This result is somewhat surprising since the Navy screens
applicants who have dependents, often requiring a waiver for them to enter the Navy.
However, due to the screening process, the sample includes very few new recruits who
enter with dependents, and the waiver process may select out those with the highest
attrition risks.
Interestingly, older recruits have significantly higher probabilities of 6-month attrition,
but significantly lower attrition rates during later career stages during the first term of ser-
vice. In addition, an increase in AFQT of 10% reduces the probability of attrition by 0.7,
0.02, 0.4, and 0.4% points, respectively, for the four career stages – with the three larger
effects being statistically significant. These estimates in terms of the direction of the effect
are consistent with prior studies (Cox, 2003; Wenger and Hodari, 2004).
Women have higher predicted attrition than males during the first 12months of service.
However, women have lower attrition during months 12–24, and their attrition is no differ-
ent than that of men during months 24–36. This result suggests that women may have
lower propensity for military service than men or have poorer job matches, which results
in higher early attrition. However, women who survive the early training period appear to
adjust well to the military lifestyle during their initial job assignments.
We also examine whether responses to changes in local unemployment rates differ by
demographic group. Such differences could arise if job match quality differs across
groups due, for example, to unmeasured differences in family background or the quality
of premilitary education. Table IV presents the results for various subsamples based on
gender and race. These models include the whole set of explanatory variables, but we
report only the estimated partial effects of the appropriate unemployment rate for each
career stage.
14Pema and Mehay (2012) find a positive relationship between completing a high school JROTC program and the
military job performance of Navy recruits.
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The results for the four groups are generally consistent with the results for the full
sample for 6-month- 12-month, and 24-month attrition. However, other than for white
males, the sub-group estimates are less likely to be statistically significant. This is likely
due to the smaller sample sizes, which are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix. Inter-
estingly, for white males, the unemployment rate does have a significant negative effect on
36-month attrition (p< 0.05), which is similar to that for the other attrition windows.
However, the estimates for 36-month attrition are weaker for the other groups, and even
positive and slightly significant (p< 0.10) for black females.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this research suggest that home-state unemployment rates significantly influ-
ence the attrition of new Navy recruits during the first two years of initial service. This is
likely because sailors with the lowest quality job matches are sorted out early during the
first term of service. Thus, the analysis for later months in the first term would have fewer
sailors who were marginally attached to the military and, thus, who would be influenced
by employment conditions in their home states. However, for white males there is some
evidence that unemployment rates affect conditional attrition rates in the third year of ser-
vice, which suggests that for this group the sorting process continues throughout the first
term of service.
Increases in early attrition during economic upturns tend to exacerbate the manpower
supply problems that are created by the negative effects of low unemployment on recruit-
ment and reenlistment. Thus, a rapidly growing civilian economy generates stresses on all
of the major sources of manpower supply to All-Volunteer militaries. The US Navy cur-
rently uses forecasts of economic conditions to predict future recruiting success and re-
enlistment rates. Our results suggest that analysts also should consider incorporating early
attrition into a broader measure of retention in these models. Adding the attrition effects
associated with changes in economic conditions would improve the accuracy of planning
models that attempt to forecast overall personnel loses.
Future research could examine lags in the effect of unemployment on attrition to
determine how long it takes sailors to attrite following changes in labor market conditions.
Delayed responses to changes in the local labor market could occur due to lags in the time
it takes sailors to learn about changes in the labor market, due to the time it takes for
TABLE IV Estimated Effects of Unemployment on Attrition, by Gender and Race
6-month attrition 12-month attritiona 24-month attritiona 36-month attritiona
Full-sample !0.005 (5.39)⁄⁄⁄ !0.002 (4.50)⁄⁄⁄ !0.003 (3.25)⁄⁄⁄ !0.001 (1.15)
By gender and race
White male !0.004 (2.74)⁄⁄⁄ !0.002 (4.19)⁄⁄⁄ !0.003 (2.52)⁄⁄ !0.002 (2.46)⁄⁄
Black male !0.005 (2.41)⁄⁄ !0.001 (1.74)⁄ !0.003 (2.22)⁄⁄ 0.002 (0.89)
White female !0.002 (1.33) !0.003 (2.89)⁄⁄⁄ !0.003 (1.50) !0.001 (0.32)
Black female !0.002 (0.67) !0.005 (6.16)⁄⁄⁄ !0.005 (2.06)⁄⁄ 0.005 (1.83)⁄
Note: aConditional attrition rates.
Specification is the same as model in Table II. The table presents only the coefficients (marginal effects) on the
unemployment rate measure. T-statistics are in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ indicate statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the sample sizes for each model by gender and race.
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sailors to realize they can ‘afford to leave,’ or due to the time it takes the military to pro-
cess them for discharge. Another topic for future research would be to examine the link
between unemployment and attrition via application of a hazard model. Such a model
could use the unemployment rate for each month rather than relying on an average unem-
ployment rate over several months of a defined career period.15 Finally, future research
could also apply unemployment rates for metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s) rather than
for states. MSA unemployment rates in many cases may be more representative of the
local labor market that would be relevant to individual attrition decisions.16
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APPENDIX
TABLE AI. Sample Sizes in Table IV for Models by Gender and Race
6-month attrition 12-month attrition 24-month attrition 36-month attrition
White male 212,604 190,673 167,187 139,319
Black male 62,365 56,357 50,004 41,069
White female 32,920 28,683 29,620 24,527
Black female 19,223 16,657 14,519 12,111
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